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Blokpoel reminds us of the importance of consistency of function across Marr’s lev-
els, but we argue that the approach to ensuring consistency that he advocates — a
strict relation through exact implementation of the higher-level function at the lower
level — is unnecessarily restrictive. We show that it forces over-complication of
the computational level (by requiring it to incorporate concerns from lower-levels)
and results in the sacrifice of the distinct responsibilities associated with each level.
We propose an alternative, no less rigorous, potential characterisation of the relation
between levels.
Introduction
Blokpoel’s attempt to constrain relationships be-
tween Marr’s levels is to be welcomed. As Blokpoel
notes, if one assumes only a loose relation between
each of Marr’s three levels then consistency between
levels (however that might be defined) cannot be en-
sured. Blockpoel proposes a two-pronged approach to
the problem of constraining relations between levels.
First, he calls for a strict relation between successive
levels, whereby each “subordinate level is an exact im-
plementation of the higher level” (p. 3), and second
he advocates the use of computational-level constraints
on inputs (i.e., constraints at the top-most, computa-
tional, level) as a way of placing limits on lower-level
accounts.
The Primary Difficulty for Strict Relations
While we support Blokpoel’s goal, his call for a strict
relation between successive levels seems to us to be un-
necessarily restrictive. It fails to acknowledge that dif-
ferent levels are subject to qualitatively different types
of constraint and in so doing it forces higher-level de-
scriptions to incorporate consequences that derive from
lower-level considerations (and arguably vice versa).
Consider the example of (well-defined) goal-directed
problem solving. An informal computational-level the-
ory based on the work of Newell and Simon (1972)
might claim this requires finding a path through state-
space from the initial state to a goal state by applying a
sequence of operators (i.e., state transition functions).
More formally, the problem may be characterised in
the language of Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide,
Wareham, and van Rooij (2013) as follows:
Input: 〈S , s0, E, g〉, where S is a set of
states, s0 ∈ S is the start state, E ⊂ [S × S ]
is the set of edges between states, reflecting
valid state transitions, and g : S → [0, 1] is
a function that maps states to 1 if and only
if they satisfy the goal (and 0 otherwise).
Output: p ∈ S +, where p1, the first element
of p, is s0, each successive pair of elements
in the path p is in E (i.e., 〈pi−1, pi〉 ∈ E for
0 < i ≤ n, where n is the length of the path
p), and pn (the last element of p) is a goal
state (i.e., g(pn) = 1).
This computational-level characterisation is intention-
ally minimal and one might argue for additional con-
straints on p (e.g., that it contains no loops or that it
is a shortest path, etc.). One might even argue that the
characterisation should specify output(s) for each po-
tential input (as Blokpoel appears to suggest). Criti-
cally, however, even with such constraints, the compu-
tational level account makes no reference to algorithmic
concepts (i.e., to concepts related to specific algorithms
that might meet the computational requirement).
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Consider now an algorithmic-level model of goal-
directed problem solving that meets the computational-
level specification. Algorithmic-level accounts typ-
ically incorporate some form of limited look-ahead,
whereby participants are argued to imagine the conse-
quences of different sequences of two or three possi-
ble moves, attach a valuation of the subsequent states,
and choose the moves with the greatest valuation. This
can be repeated until a goal state is achieved. More
information is required to flesh out this sketch into a
specific algorithm. Minimally we require a valuation
function v : S → R that maps states to values, and
which is maximised for goal states, together with a
look-ahead parameter (typically denoted k) that spec-
ifies the depth of look-ahead. While one can imag-
ine different algorithmic-level models based on differ-
ent value functions (v), the look-ahead parameter (k) re-
flects a resource constraint — a limitation on the algo-
rithm imposed either by the human cognitive aparatus
or by the requirement to act in a timely manner.
Consider now a specific problem, say one that re-
quires at least d steps for its solution. For values of
k less than d there is no guarantee that the algorithmic-
level account will concur with the computational-level
account, but for all solvable problems (i.e., all problems
that can be solved in a finite number of moves), regard-
less of the value function, the output of the algorithmic
account will match the computational-level for a suffi-
ciently large value of k.
Our example is somewhat different from the exam-
ple cited by Blokpoel. He discusses Bayesian Inverse
Planning (BIP) as an account of how one might infer
an agent’s goals from its actions (and knowledge of the
probabilistic relations between actions and goals). In
the case of BIP, the argument (from tractability con-
siderations) is that for the theory to be psychologically
plausible one of two constraints must hold. These con-
straints concern the number of goals that must be con-
sidered, the maximum number of “values” for those
goals (e.g., within the BIP framework a goal such as
satisfy hunger might have three values: big-hunger,
medium-hunger or little-hunger), and the probabilities
of different combinations of goals. In this case the con-
straints relate to the environment within which BIP is
tractable. But presumably even with a suitably con-
strained environment, different algorithms may intro-
duce different resource constraints such that the algo-
rithm will only approximate the computational-level
BIP theory. Alternatively, the limits on the number of
goals etc. required for BIP to be tractable may be im-
posed by architectural limitations (e.g., working mem-
ory capacity limitations), which flow from lower-level
considerations (and not the computational level).
An Alternative Proposal
Given the above arguments, we propose an alterna-
tive account (to that of Blokpoel, 2017) concerning the
relationship between levels. In order to ensure consis-
tency between levels, Blokpoel proposes:
A(i) = C(i)
for all inputs i within the cognitive capacity’s domain,
where C is a computational-level theory andA is a cor-
responding algorithmic-level theory. We propose in-
stead the following relation between the algorithmic
and computational levels:
lim
r→∞Ar(i) = C(i)
for all valid inputs i, where r denotes the resources
of the specific algorithm Ar which implements (in the
sense of Blokpoel) C, the target computational-level
theory. Critically, in this alternative formulation r con-
cerns the algorithmic level and does not feature in the
computational-level theory.1
In formal terms, it is of course possible to fold r into
the computational level so as to preserve the position of
Blokpoel (2017), viz.:
A(i, r) = C(i, r)
However, this formulation adds unnecessary compli-
cation to the computational-level specification — one
must consider resources and their availability as a fur-
ther input to the computational level. Perhaps more
critically it locates r at the wrong level as r is a prop-
erty of a specific algorithm. Different algorithms may
use qualitatively different resources, and pushing the
resource into the computational level means that the
computational-level description is no longer algorithm
independent.
1We assume a similar formulation of the relation between
the algorithmic and representational level and the implemen-
tation level.
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These concerns are magnified if one adopts the logi-
cal extension of Blokpoel’s approach to the implemen-
tation level. Here one would be required to fold neu-
ral constraints into both the algorithmic and representa-
tional level and then into the computational level. Do-
ing so loses one of the main reasons for distinguishing
between levels in the first place — namely that one can
work at one level without being overly concerned by
lower (and higher) level constraints.
An Additional Concern
A subsidiary argument made by Blokpoel (2017) is
that “each computational-level constraint limits the set
of possible algorithms” (p. 8). While this may well
be true of some computational-level constraints, it is
not true of all computational-level constraints. The
tractability constraint is a case in point. As van Rooij
(2008) notes, some researchers have dismissed vari-
ous computational-level theories on the grounds that
they are intractable, meaning that there is provably no
known algorithm that can compute the output of the
computational-level theory in a reasonable time (where
“reasonable” time is defined as a polynomial function
of some complexity parameter of the input, such as the
input’s length). van Rooij further argues that this dis-
missal is unjustified if the specific inputs which require
unreasonable time are not typically encountered. In
other words, van Rooij’s argument is that restricting in-
puts effectively renders tractable some computational-
level theories that would otherwise be intractable. This
is a position that we, and Blokpoel (2017) endorse.
However, restricting inputs typically increases the space
of potential algorithms because algorithms that might
be unreasonable on the full set of inputs may be reason-
able when the set of inputs is restricted. Consequently,
it is not the case that computational-level constraints
necessarily limit the set of possible algorithms.
Conclusion
We have argued that the relation between the com-
putational and algorithmic levels proposed by Blokpoel
(2017) is idealistic. It may hold in the limit as re-
source (and other algorithmic-level) constraints are re-
laxed, but demanding that it hold independently of
algorithmic-level constraints does not fully appreciate
the purpose of distinguishing between levels. In our
view, the root of the difficulty arises from Blokpoel’s
assertion that “the competence/performance distinction
[is] orthogonal to Marr’s levels of analysis” (Blokpoel,
2017, p. 2). While the distinction is not without its
own difficulties (e.g., in identifying competence based
purely on performance), Marr (1982) explicitly iden-
tified the competence theory of Chomsky (1965) as
a computational-level theory, contrasting it with an
algorithmic-level performance theory.
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